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UNCONSTITUTIONAL EMOLUMENTS:
THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA CONSTITUTION*
JOHN V. ORTH**
Both the United States Constitution and the North Carolina
Constitution include emoluments clauses, but neither constitution
defines the meaning of emoluments. Suits in federal courts against
President Donald Trump charging him with receiving prohibited
emoluments have raised the question whether emoluments as used in
the Federal Constitution are limited to payments for employment or
office-holding. A review of North Carolina cases reveals that
emoluments, as used in the state constitution, are not limited to
compensation for public employment but may include benefits or
privileges granted in consideration of public services more
generally.
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INTRODUCTION
A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely
necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.
—N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35
The election of President Donald Trump, a businessman in the active
pursuit of profit, has raised questions concerning two emoluments clauses
in the United States Constitution. 1 Article I, Section 9 prohibits federal
* © 2019 John V. Orth.
** William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. (history) 1977, Harvard University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; cl. 8; id. art. II, cl. 7. A third emoluments clause concerns
senators and representatives, who are prohibited from being appointed to any federal office
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officers, including the president, from receiving “any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any Kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign
State,” except with the consent of Congress. 2 Article II, Section 1 limits the
compensation of the president to a salary “which shall neither be encreased
[sic] nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected,
and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the
United States, or any of them.” 3 Together, these clauses are designed to
ensure the undivided loyalty of federal office holders. Mindful of corrupt
practices in English history, 4 the framers of the Constitution worked to
ensure the integrity of officials in the new republic. 5
Constitutional provisions concerning emoluments were not new when
the Federal Constitution was drafted and ratified. The first state
constitutions, adopted a dozen years earlier in the aftermath of the
Revolution, also included emoluments clauses. 6 Unlike the United States
Constitution, which established a federal government for a union of preexisting states, the prior state constitutions organized the governments of
those states. When the former British colonies declared their independence
on July 4, 1776, they cut themselves off from the previous source of their
political authority. 7 As one revolutionary leader in North Carolina later
explained, “At the time of our separation from Great Britain, we were
thrown into a similar situation with a set of people ship-wrecked and cast on
a maroon’d island‒without laws, without magistrates, without government,
or any legal authority.”8 The government of the former Crown colony—now
an independent state—had to be built on a new foundation: popular
sovereignty. Power would no longer come from the top down but from the
bottom up.
“which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased [sic]”
during their time in Congress. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
2. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
3. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
4. See, e.g., SIR GEORGE C LARK, THE L ATER S TUARTS 1660–1714, at 86–87, 130 (2d ed.
1955) (describing secret pensions paid by King Louis XIV of France to King Charles II and King
James II of England); LEWIS N AMIER, THE S TRUCTURE OF POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF
GEORGE III 2–4 (2d ed. 1929) (emphasizing the role of family ties and patronage in English
politics in 1760).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
6. See generally THE FEDERAL AND S TATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL C HARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC L AWS OF THE UNITED S TATES (Ben Perley Poore ed., Washington Government
Printing Office 2d ed. 1877) (reprinting several, original state constitutions).
7. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
8. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 6 (1787) (Ashe, J.). Samuel Ashe had been a
member of the committee of the Fifth Provincial Congress in 1776 that drafted the North Carolina
Declaration of Rights and Constitution. See 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
913–14, 918 (William Saunders ed., 1890); Lindley S. Butler, Provincial Congresses, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH C AROLINA 917, 918 (William S. Powell ed., 2006).
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On December 18, 1776, North Carolina adopted its first constitution.9
The very first section of the North Carolina Constitution’s Declaration of
Rights proclaimed the new basis of legal authority: “That all political Power
is vested in and derived from the people only.” 10 The second section spelled
out the necessary consequence for North Carolina: “That the people of this
State ought to have the sole and exclusive Right of regulating the internal
Government and Police thereof.” 11 Section 3 declared that there would be
no privileged classes in the new state: “That no Man or set of Men are
entitled to exclusive or separate Emoluments or Privileges from the
Community, but in Consideration of Public Services.”12
After establishing various other political principles, such as separation
of powers,13 and guaranteeing important civil rights, particularly those of
criminal defendants, 14 the Declaration of Rights returned to the issue of
privileged classes. Section 22 declared that “no Hereditary Emoluments
Privileges, or Honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State.” 15 The
next section concerned the associated issue of economic privilege: “That
Perpetuities and Monopolies are contrary to the Genius of a free State, and
ought not to be allowed.”16 These clauses, read in combination, make it
9. 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH C AROLINA, supra note 8, at 974; 23 THE STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH C AROLINA 980–84 (Walter Clark ed., 1904). The Declaration of Rights had
been adopted the day before. 10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH C AROLINA, supra note 8, at 973;
23 THE S TATE RECORDS OF NORTH C AROLINA, supra, at 977–79. The Constitution made the
Declaration “part of the constitution of this State.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 44.
10. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 1, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS
OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 9, at 977.
11. Id. § 2, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 9, at 977.
12. Id. § 3. This section has been described as “a general statement of the fundamental
inalienable rights of man—equal rights to all, special privileges to none.” Robert D. Lewis, Note,
Constitutional Law—Special Privileges and Emoluments—Race Track Franchise, 33 N.C. L.
REV. 109, 109, 112 (1954) (citing State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575, 80 S.E.2d 625 (1954)).
13. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4, reprinted in 23 T HE S TATE RECORDS
OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 9, at 977.
14. Id. §§ 7–13.
15. Id. § 22, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH C AROLINA, supra note 9, at
978. Describing the “[r]eal emotion” that lay behind provisions like this one, Gordon Wood
explained that “the revolutionaries knew only too well what kin and patrimonial officeholding
had meant in their lives.” GORDON S. WOOD, THE R ADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
181 (1991). The framers of the Federal Constitution were well aware of the public feeling. See id.
The United States Constitution reinforced the state’s ban. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No
State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”).
16. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 23, reprinted in 23 THE S TATE RECORDS
OF NORTH C AROLINA, supra note 9, at 978. Referring specifically to this section, Gordon Wood
commented that “[f]rom the outset the new republican states . . . tended to view with suspicion
the traditional monarchical practice of enlisting private wealth and energy for public purposes by
issuing corporate privileges and licenses to private persons.” WOOD, supra note 15, at 187–88. In
fact, the monarchical practice was to use the grant of a monopoly as a gift of revenue rather than
as an incentive for serving public purposes. See, e.g., The Case of Monopolies (1602) 77 Eng.
Rep. 1260, 2160–61 (KB) (invalidating a royal grant of a monopoly for the import and sale of
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clear that in the “free State” of North Carolina, there would be only one
class of citizen: free men, who would compete equally for political and
economic advantage. 17 Unlike the emoluments clauses of the United States
Constitution, which were designed to prevent federal officials from being
corrupted by foreign governments, Congress, or the states, the North
Carolina emoluments clauses were designed to prevent the state
government from favoring one person or group over another.
North Carolina was not alone among the former British colonies in its
determination to prevent the development of privileged classes. In fact,
both emoluments clauses in the North Carolina Declaration of Rights were
derived from a section of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which had
been adopted earlier in 1776, providing that “no man, or set of men, are
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the
community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being
descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to
be hereditary.”18 The first emoluments clause of the North Carolina
Declaration of Rights (Section 3) is copied directly from the Virginia
Declaration, while the second emoluments clause (Section 22) generalizes
the Virginia ban on hereditary offices into a ban on any “Hereditary
Emoluments, Privileges or Honors.”19
Since their adoption in 1776, the North Carolina emoluments clauses
have undergone only editorial changes, but their position and context have
been altered, raising the risk of subtly altering their significance. In 1868,
when the state adopted its second constitution, the Declaration of Rights
became Article I, and its sections were renumbered—a renumbering
necessitated by the insertion of sections recognizing the effects of the Civil
War. The ban on exclusive emoluments or privileges (Section 3 in 1776)
became Section 7 in 1868, 20 separated from the sections on popular

playing cards). On the later history of section 23, see generally John V. Orth, Allowing
Perpetuities in North Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399 (2009).
17. Almost a century would pass before the abolition of slavery ended the distinction
between free men and slaves. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. And almost another half-century would
elapse before women would be granted the vote. Id. amend. XIX.
18. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 4, reprinted in T HE FEDERAL AND S TATE
CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL C HARTERS, AND O THER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED S TATES,
supra note 6, at 1909; see John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1759, 1797 (1992) (listing sources of various sections of the North Carolina Declaration of Rights
of 1776).
19. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 22, reprinted in 23 THE S TATE RECORDS
OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 9, at 978.
20. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 7, reprinted in NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1981–1982, at
847 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed.) (“No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.”).
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sovereignty by sections prohibiting secession, 21 pledging allegiance to the
government of the United States, 22 and prohibiting the repayment of any
debt incurred to fund the recent “insurrection or rebellion” or paying “any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave.” 23 Because of those and
other new sections, the ban on hereditary emoluments (Section 22 in 1776)
became Section 30 in 1868, moving it further away from the ban on
exclusive emoluments than it had been in the original 1776 Constitution. 24
More significant contextual changes occurred in the latest North
Carolina Constitution, which went into effect in 1971. 25 The ban on
exclusive emoluments or privileges (Section 3 in 1776 and Section 7 in
1868) was relocated in order to group it with the ban on hereditary
emoluments and became Section 32 in the 1971 Constitution, 26 separating it
even further from the provisions on self-government. At the same time, the
original phrase “man, or set of men” in the ban on exclusive emoluments or
privileges was replaced with “person or set of persons.” 27 Throughout the
1971 Constitution, captions were added to the various sections. The section
that banned exclusive emoluments or privileges was labeled simply
“Exclusive emoluments,” obscuring the equal ban on exclusive privileges. 28
The section on hereditary emoluments (Section 22 in 1776 and Section 30
in 1868) became Section 33 in the 1971 Constitution, with the descriptive
caption “Hereditary emoluments and honors.”29
Since 1776 there has been no attempt to create hereditary emoluments
or honors in North Carolina, so the section prohibiting them has only
infrequently been cited—usually in connection with the prohibitions on
exclusive emoluments and on perpetuities and monopolies—to demonstrate
the framers’ intent to prohibit privileged classes. 30 By contrast, the North
21. Id. § 4, reprinted in NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1981–1982, supra note 20, at 846–47.
22. Id. § 5, reprinted in NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1981–1982, supra note 20, at 847.
23. Id. § 6.
24. Id. § 30, reprinted in NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1981–1982, supra note 20, at 848
(“No hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, ought to be granted or conferred in this
State.”).
25. See JOHN V. ORTH & P AUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH C AROLINA S TATE
CONSTITUTION 32–38 (2d ed. 2013).
26. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. art. I, § 33 (“No hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall be granted or
conferred in this State.”).
30. See, e.g., Bryan v. Patrick, 124 N.C. 651, 661, 33 S.E. 151, 153 (1899) (“When our
people were organizing a new state . . . [, t]hey intended and did relieve themselves from
burdensome fetters and trammels, and did whatever was necessary for their safety and to promote
the general welfare. This reasoning is not a mere question of construction. . . . It is declared in the
Constitution Art. I, sec. 7, ‘No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments

97 N.C. L. REV. 1727 (2019)

1732

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

Carolina ban on exclusive emoluments has been “frequently invoked by
[the Supreme Court of North Carolina] to strike down legislation
conferring special privileges not in consideration of public service.” 31
I. DEFINITION OF EMOLUMENTS
The constitutional definition of emoluments is disputed. Most
dictionaries at the time of the drafting of the North Carolina and federal
constitutions defined emolument simply as “[p]rofit” or “advantage.” 32 A
century later, the first edition of Henry Campbell Black’s Dictionary of
Law (1891) gave a more elaborate definition, emphasizing payment for
services: “The profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as a compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office as salary, fees, and perquisites . . . .”33 At the same
time, it added a more general definition—“advantage; gain, public or
private” 34—with no mention of employment or office-holding. This general
definition continued to appear in subsequent editions of Black’s legal
dictionary for the next hundred years, through the revised fourth edition in
1968,35 after which only the definition of emolument tied to office or
or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services’; in section 30, ‘No
hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State’; and
in section 31, ‘Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State and ought not
to be allowed.’”). Similar statements appear in Washington Toll Bridge Co. v. Commissioners of
Beaufort, 81 N.C. 491, 504–05 (1879) and McRee v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R., 47 N.C. (2
Jones) 186, 190 (1855).
31. Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 698, 36 S.E.2d 281, 286 (1945). For examples of
violations of the emoluments clause, see Cowan v. Sec. Life & Trust Co., 211 N.C. 18, 21, 188
S.E. 812, 814 (1936); and Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 498, 503 (1874).
32. See, e.g., 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN WHICH
THE WORDS ARE DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS, AND ILLUSTRATED IN T HEIR D IFFERENT
SIGNIFICATIONS BY EXAMPLES FROM THE BEST WRITERS, TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED, A H ISTORY
OF THE LANGUAGE AND AN ENGLISH GRAMMAR (3d ed. 1755). But see James C. Philips & Sara
White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus
Linguistic Analysis of American English from 1760–1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 233–34 (2017)
(concluding that “the Congressional and Presidential Emoluments Clauses would have most likely
been understood to contain a narrow, office or public-employment sense of ‘emolument,’” but
recognizing that “the Foreign Emoluments Clause is more ambiguous given the modifying
language ‘of any kind whatever’”).
33. Emolument, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891). The definition also included a
final phrase: “Any perquisite, advantage, profit, or gain arising from the possession of an office,”
and cited 105 Pa. St. 303, id., a mistake for 105 Pa. 303, the citation of Apple v. Crawford, 105
Pa. 303 (1884); a mistake corrected in the second edition of Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition
of emolument, which added citations to Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. 109 (1850) and Vansant v.
State, 53 A. 711 (Md. 1902). See Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910).
34. Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (citing “Webster,” i.e., Webster’s
Dictionary, without indicating any particular edition).
35. Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (replacing the citations to
Hoyt and Vansant with citations to United States v. MacMillan, 209 F. 266 (N.D. Ill. 1913);
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employment appeared. 36 Beginning with the seventh edition in 1999, the
definition of emolument in Black’s Law Dictionary was shortened to “[a]ny
advantage, profit, or gain received as a result of one’s employment or one’s
holding of office,” 37 a definition that remained unchanged in subsequent
editions and appears in the most recent, tenth edition published in 2014.38
Suits currently pending in federal courts against President Trump
charge him with receiving prohibited emoluments from foreign
governments and from federal and state instrumentalities. 39 On behalf of
the president, the United States Department of Justice has argued that the
meaning of emolument is limited to “profit arising from an office or
employ,” 40 while the plaintiffs have argued for a more general definition,
including advantages gained as a result of his office. 41 North Carolina cases
have not drawn a sharp distinction between emoluments granted as
compensation for public services in the form of public office-holding or
employment and emoluments granted in consideration of public services
more generally. Nonetheless it is useful to consider the two separately.
II. EMOLUMENTS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Two North Carolina cases concerning emoluments for public
employment illustrate the need to justify certain payments as compensation
for public services. In 1995, in Leete v. County of Warren,42 the Supreme

McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374 (1912); and State ex rel. Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145
(1938)).
36. Emolument, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (defining emolument as the
“profit arising from office, employment, or labor; that which is received as a compensation for
services, or which is annexed to the possession of office as salary, fees, and perquisites. Any
perquisite, advantage, profit, or gain arising from the possession of an office” and deleting the
citation to MacMillan); Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (continuing to
omit the citation to MacMillan).
37. Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
38. See Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Emolument, BLACK’S
LAW D ICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
39. See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2018); Dist. of Columbia
v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 732 (D. Md. 2017); Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington (CREW) v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 179 (2017).
40. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 28, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (2017) (No. 1:17-CV-00458)
(quoting JAMES BARCLAY, Emolument, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH D ICTIONARY ON
A NEW PLAN (Richardson & Urquhart et al. eds., London 1774)). The complete definition of
emolument in Barclay is “profit arising from an office or employ; gain or advantage.” JAMES
BARCLAY, Emolument, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH D ICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN
(Richardson & Urquhart et al. eds., London 1774).
41. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 30–32,
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (2017) (No. 1:17-CV00458).
42. 341 N.C. 116, 462 S.E.2d 476 (1995).
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Court of North Carolina held that a grant of funds to a county manager
after his voluntary resignation conferred an unconstitutional emolument
because the funds were not being granted in exchange for employment. 43
By contrast, in 1999, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Crump v.
Snead44 held that a state statute retroactively extending the term, and
therefore continuing the compensation of an elected town councilmember,
did not confer an unconstitutional emolument because the councilmember
was being paid for services rendered while in public office. 45 Defining
emolument, the court in Crump relied on the sixth edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary (1990): “[T]he profit arising from office, employment, or labor;
that which is received as a compensation for services, or which is annexed
to the possession of office as salary, fees, and perquisites.” 46
III. EMOLUMENTS FOR PUBLIC SERVICES IN GENERAL
Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina has struck down many
state-granted emoluments and privileges,47 it has upheld many as well.48
Notwithstanding definitions of emoluments as compensation for office or
employment, North Carolina courts have not limited the meaning of
constitutional emoluments to payments for public employment. Payments
or other nonmonetary benefits may be granted by the state in consideration
of public services more generally. In cases concerning state-provided
benefits to veterans of World War I and World War II, for example, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected claims of unconstitutional
emoluments or privileges, even though the recipients’ services were
completed and had not been rendered to North Carolina, but had been
“primarily rendered to the United States.” 49
43. See id. at 117, 123, 462 S.E.2d at 477, 480.
44. 134 N.C. App. 353, 517 S.E.2d 384 (1999).
45. See id. at 354, 356–57, 517 S.E.2d at 385, 387.
46. Id. at 356, 517 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990)). The court in Snead omitted the additional phrase, also emphasizing payment for service in
office that appeared in the sixth edition: “Any perquisite, advantage, profit, or gain arising from
the possession of an office.” Emolument, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
47. See, e.g., Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 94, 66 S.E.2d 22, 28 (1951).
48. See, e.g., Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 658, 386
S.E.2d 200, 214 (1989); Motley v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 228 N.C. 337, 342, 345, 45
S.E.2d 550, 553, 555 (1947); Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 698, 36 S.E.2d 281, 286 (1945);
Hinton v. Lacy, 193 N.C. 496, 500, 513, 137 S.E. 669, 672, 678 (1927).
49. Brumley, 225 N.C. at 696, 698, 36 S.E.2d at 285–86 (holding that the donation of
municipal land for World War II Veterans’ Center was not an unconstitutional emolument); see
also Motley, 228 N.C. at 345, 45 S.E.2d at 555 (holding that a statute making veterans of World
War I and World War II who had practiced barbering for three years in the army eligible to
become registered barbers without examination and apprenticeship was not an unconstitutional
emolument); Hinton, 193 N.C. at 513, 137 S.E.2d at 678 (holding that a home loan program for
veterans of World War I was not an unconstitutional emolument).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1727 (2019)

2019]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL EMOLUMENTS

1735

In 1987, in Town of Emerald Isle v. State,50 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina radically restated the “public services” required to support
an exclusive emolument or privilege. Without mention of public office or
employment—or of any other services rendered to the public by the
beneficiary—the court directed attention to the public good to be served by
the benefit.51 Upholding a statute that restricted traffic but conferred an
exemption in favor of a certain set of persons,52 the court held that an
exclusive benefit is not an unconstitutional emolument or privilege if the
benefit is “intended to promote the general welfare rather than the benefit
of the individual” and if “there is a reasonable basis for the legislature to
conclude the granting of the [benefit] serves the public interest.” 53
The decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Town of
Highlands v. Hendricks,54 involving an unusual condemnation proceeding,
illustrates North Carolina’s dual approach to emoluments. After reciting the
definition in Black’s Law Dictionary—“[a]ny perquisite, advantage, profit,
or gain arising from the possession of an office” 55—the court upheld the
condemnation without further mention of office or employment,56 using the
“two-prong test” outlined in Town of Emerald Isle for determining the
existence of an unconstitutional emolument: “the exemption or benefit is
intended to promote the general welfare rather than the benefit of the
individual, and . . . there is a reasonable basis for the legislature to conclude
that the granting of the exemption or benefit serves the public interest.” 57 In
2011, in Saine v. State,58 the court of appeals upheld grants to a private,
nonprofit school, holding that they did not constitute unconstitutional
emoluments because they served “a public purpose.” 59 As these cases
illustrate, in the analysis of unconstitutional emoluments or privileges in
North Carolina, the requirement of public services to support such benefits

50. 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).
51. See id. at 654, 360 S.E.2d at 764.
52. See id. at 652, 655, 360 S.E.2d at 763–65.
53. See id. at 654, 360 S.E.2d at 764.
54. 164 N.C. App. 474, 596 S.E.2d 440 (2004).
55. Id. at 478, 596 S.E.2d at 444. Although the court cited to the seventh edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary, the language quoted by the court is part of the definition of emolument in the
sixth edition, see Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990), and does not appear in
the definition of emolument in the seventh edition, see Emolument, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY
(7th ed. 1999).
56. Hendricks, 164 N.C. App. at 479–80, 596 S.E.2d at 445.
57. Id. at 479, 596 S.E.2d at 444–45 (citing Peacock v. Shinn, 139 N.C. App. 487, 495, 533
S.E.2d 842, 848 (2000)).
58. 210 N.C. App. 594, 709 S.E.2d 379 (2011).
59. Id. at 607, 709 S.E.2d at 389.
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may be satisfied by results that promote “the general welfare,” serve “the
public interest,” or further “a public purpose.” 60
In deciding whether a particular service furthers a public purpose, a
court may also be guided by decisions concerning the “public purposes”
that have been held to support the state’s exercise of the taxing power. The
Finance Article, Article V of the North Carolina Constitution, provides that
“[t]he power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner,
for public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended, or
contracted away.”61 Although this section literally limits only the state’s
power to tax, it has also been construed to limit as well the state’s power to
spend the money raised by taxation: “The power to appropriate money
from the public treasury is no greater than the power to levy the tax which
put the money in the treasury.” 62
In a 1999 advisory opinion concerning proposed government grants to
hurricane victims, the North Carolina Attorney General’s Office described
the test for determining violations of the emoluments clause as “very
similar to the test for determining violations of the public purpose clause of
Article V, Section 2(1) of the Constitution.” 63 Although the North Carolina
Supreme Court has “expressly declined to ‘confine public purpose by
judicial definition,’”64 a grant of emoluments will generally be upheld if it
is reasonably connected to a legitimate aim of government and if the
ultimate benefit of the program accrues to the benefit of the general public
and not to special interests or particular persons. 65

60. The expansive meaning of “public services” in the exclusive emoluments clause of the
North Carolina Constitution is reminiscent of the expansive meaning of “public use” in the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (stating that the United States Supreme Court applies “the
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose’”).
61. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
62. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 143, 159 S.E.2d 745, 749–50
(1968).
63. N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED DISASTER RELIEF PROGRAMS; CONSTITUTIONALITY
WITH RESPECT TO THE P UBLIC P URPOSE AND EXCLUSIVE EMOLUMENT CLAUSES (Dec. 13,
1999),
http://www.ncdoj.gov/About-DOJ/Legal-Services/Legal-Opinions/Opinions/ProposedDisaster-Relief-Programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/9UN9-R6AR].
64. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 646, 386 S.E.2d 200,
207 (1989) (quoting Stanley v. Dep’t of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 33, 199 S.E. 641, 653
(1973)) (holding that a municipality may operate its own cable television system, so long as there
is a “reasonable connection with convenience and necessity of the [State]” and the service
benefits the public generally). For additional commentary on Madison Cablevision, see generally
Edward Hardy Lewis, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems: Madison Cablevision,
Inc. v. City of Morganton, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
65. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 712, 727, 467 S.E.2d 615, 618,
627 (1996) (holding that incentive grants to private corporations for economic development
satisfied the public purpose requirement). For a recent analysis of economic incentives, see
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IV. EMOLUMENTS AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Although emolument is an unfamiliar—even peculiar—word,66 the
emoluments clauses of the North Carolina Constitution express
fundamental principles of state government. The original placement of the
exclusive emoluments clause in the Declaration of Rights put it in close
proximity to the basic principle of popular sovereignty. 67 All power is from
the people, and the state would not create privileged classes among free
men.68 Even before its relocation in 1971, the exclusive emoluments
clause—in conjunction with the hereditary emoluments clause and the
perpetuities and monopolies clause—was seen as essential to “the genius of
a free state.” 69 “The meaning and purpose” of the three provisions was, as
Justice Richmond Pearson observed in 1855, “to put in motion the ‘new
state’ . . . as a free representative republican government, relieved from all
fetters and trammels previously existing by which its action might be
cramped or circumscribed, and fully authorized to do everything necessary
and proper to accomplish its mission, that is, promote the general
welfare.”70
In the years before the state constitution specifically defined “general
laws,”71 the Supreme Court of North Carolina relied on the exclusive
generally C. Tyler Mulligan, Economic Development Incentives and North Carolina Local
Governments: A Framework for Analysis, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2021 (2013).
66. The origin of “emolument” is traced to the Latin emolumentum, “profit, gain, lit[erally],
sum paid to have grain ground up.” Emolument, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1971).
67. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
69. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34 (“Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a
free state and shall not be allowed.”); see also Genius, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1971) (giving, as one of the definitions of genius, “peculiar, distinctive, or
identifying character: essential nature or spirit”).
70. McRee v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R., 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 186, 190 (1855).
71. A definition of general laws first appeared in the North Carolina Constitution in 1961 as
part of a general revision of the Judicial Article. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 20 (amended
1961). The section was amended and moved to the Miscellaneous Article in 1969. See N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 3 (amended 1969). It attained its present form in the new constitution
in 1971. See N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (“Whenever the General Assembly is directed or
authorized by this Constitution to enact general laws, or general laws uniformly applicable
throughout the State, or general laws uniformly applicable in every county, city and town, and
other unit of local government, or in every local court district, no special or local act shall be
enacted concerning the subject matter directed or authorized to be accomplished by general or
uniformly applicable laws, and every amendment or repeal of any law relating to such subject
matter shall also be general and uniform in its effect throughout the State. General laws may be
enacted for classes defined by population or other criteria. General laws uniformly applicable
throughout the State shall be made applicable without classification or exception in every unit of
local government of like kind, such as every county, or every city and town, but need not be made
applicable in every unit of local government in the State. General laws uniformly applicable in
every county, city and town, and other unit of local government, or in every local court district,
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emoluments clause for the definition: “There are Constitutions,” Justice
William Adams observed in 1927, “which provide in express terms that
general laws shall have a uniform operation; ours embodies the principle in
the following language: ‘No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in
consideration of public services.’” 72
The court declared that the ban on exclusive emoluments—coupled
with the ban on perpetuities and monopolies—embodies a “fundamental
democratic principle: ‘Equal rights and opportunities to all, special
privileges to none.’”73 The two clauses, said the court, guarantee
that every valid enactment of a general law applicable to the whole
State shall operate uniformly upon persons and property, giving to
all under like circumstances equal protection and security and neither
laying burdens nor conferring privileges upon any person that are not
laid or conferred upon others under the same circumstances or
conditions.74
CONCLUSION
Both the United States Constitution and the North Carolina
Constitution include emoluments clauses, but the function and wording of
the respective clauses are significantly different. The emoluments clauses
of the Federal Constitution are designed to prevent federal office holders
from being distracted from their duties by the possibility of benefits
conferred by foreign states, Congress, or the states. By contrast, the
emoluments clauses of the North Carolina Constitution implement
fundamental principles of state government: popular sovereignty, uniform
laws, and equal protection. Although some North Carolina cases limit
emoluments to compensation for public employment, many others uphold
shall be made applicable without classification or exception in every unit of local government, or
in every local court district, as the case may be. The General Assembly may at any time repeal
any special, local, or private act.”); see also N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24 (prohibiting local, private,
or special acts on a variety of subjects).
72. State v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 292, 136 S.E. 709, 710 (1927) (quoting N.C. C ONST. of
1868, art. I, § 7).
73. State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575, 587, 80 S.E.2d 625, 634 (1954) (holding an act allowing
one county to permit betting on horse or dog racing to be an unconstitutional emolument or
privilege).
74. Id. at 583, 80 S.E.2d at 631; see also N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADVISORY OPINION; TREE
CUTTING IN FRONT OF BILLBOARDS (Feb. 10, 1995), http://www.ncdoj.gov/About-DOJ/LegalServices/Legal-Opinions/Opinions/Tree-Cutting-in-Front-of-Billboards.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
Z559-33S2] (“The test for constitutionality generally applied to the granting of special privileges
and immunities [under article I, section 32 of the state constitution] is substantially similar to that
used in determining whether the equal protection of the laws have [sic] been denied by the
state.”).
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state-granted payments or privileges in consideration of public services
more generally. With respect to the grant of emoluments or privileges, the
public services required to support such grants may in some cases be
satisfied by benefits that are intended to promote the general welfare, serve
the public interest, or further a public purpose. In these cases, the granting
of the emoluments or privileges is not dependent on services provided by
the benefited individual or group.
While the public services required to support the grant of emoluments
or privileges cannot be defined with precision, guidance may be found in
an examination of prior cases, not only those construing emoluments and
privileges as used in article I, section 32, but also those construing other
phrases used in the state constitution: public purposes, uniform laws, and
equal protection. Throughout, the meaning to be given to the emoluments
clauses is informed by returning to the fundamental principles of North
Carolina government.
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